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Nearly 4 years after the first report of the emergence of Middle-East respiratory syndrome 
Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and nearly 1800 human cases later, the ecology of MERS-
CoV, its epidemiology, and more than risk factors of MERS-CoV transmission between 
camels are poorly understood. Knowledge about the pathways and mechanisms of 
transmission from animals to humans is limited; as of yet, transmission risks have not 
been quantified. Moreover the divergent sanitary situations and exposures to animals 
among populations in the Arabian Peninsula, where human primary cases appear to 
dominate, vs. other regions in the Middle East and Africa, with no reported human 
clinical cases and where the virus has been detected only in dromedaries, represents 
huge scientific and health challenges. Here, we have used expert-opinion elicitation in 
order to obtain ideas on relative importance of MERS-CoV risk factors and estimates 
of transmission risks from various types of contact between humans and dromedaries. 
Fourteen experts with diverse and extensive experience in MERS-CoV relevant fields 
were enrolled and completed an online questionnaire that examined pathways based on 
several scenarios, e.g., camels–camels, camels–human, bats/other species to camels/
humans, and the role of diverse biological substances (milk, urine, etc.) and potential 
fomites. Experts believed that dromedary camels play the largest role in MERS-CoV 
infection of other dromedaries; however, they also indicated a significant influence of the 
season (i.e. calving or weaning periods) on transmission risk. All experts thought that 
MERS-CoV-infected dromedaries and asymptomatic humans play the most important 
role in infection of humans, with bats and other species presenting a possible, but yet 
undefined, risk. Direct and indirect contact of humans with dromedary camels were 
identified as the most risky types of contact, when compared to consumption of various 
camel products, with estimated “most likely” incidence risks of at least 22 and 13% for 
direct and indirect contact, respectively. The results of our study are consistent with avail-
able, yet very limited, published data regarding the potential pathways of transmission of 
MERS-CoV at the animal–human interface. These results identify key knowledge gaps 
and highlight the need for more comprehensive, yet focused research to be conducted 
to better understand transmission between dromedaries and humans.
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FigUre 1 | review of Mers-coV exposure pathways for animal-to-animal transmission and animal-to-human transmission based on literature 
evidence and the expert opinions elicited in this study (67–71).
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inTrODUcTiOn
Nearly 4 years after the first report of the emergence of Middle-
East respiratory syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in humans 
and more than 1800 human cases later (1), mainly in Saudi Arabia 
(~75% of cases and almost all of the primary cases), the ecology 
of MERS-CoV and its epidemiology remain poorly understood 
(2). Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV accounts 
for approximately half of all the MERS-CoV cases reported to 
date (2). Inter-human transmission has been well documented 
in health care-associated outbreaks in the Middle East and Korea 
(3–5), and there appears to be limited inter-human transmission 
in household settings (6).
Many studies have now identified dromedary camels (Camelus 
dromedarius; dromedaries) as a natural host for MERS-CoV, 
and there appears to be ample evidence of widespread infection 
(either past or present) in dromedaries in the Middle East (7–10) 
and in many parts of Africa (11–15). High levels of MERS-CoV 
specific seroprevalence have been observed in dromedaries, rang-
ing from 0% in Central Asia to as much as 100% in Africa and 
the Arabian Peninsula (7–17) (see Figure 1). MERS-CoV strains 
isolated from dromedaries are genetically and phenotypically 
very similar or identical to those infecting humans (18, 19).
Since the beginning of the MERS-CoV outbreak, animals 
and specifically dromedaries, have been suspected of playing a 
role in transmission. The global camel population has more than 
doubled in the past 50 years, reaching ~30 million today, 95% of 
which are dromedaries. Approximately 60% of camels are found 
in East African countries, which are important exporters to the 
Arabian peninsula and Egypt (20). Camels play a major role in 
socio-cultural traditions in Saudi Arabia; a place where the camel 
population has increased from 80,000 to 200,000 heads over the 
last 50 years; a number which some experts estimate is actually 
closer to 800,000 heads (21). In parallel, a drastic decrease (from 
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10 to 1.5%) of nomadic camel populations has been observed 
over this time period in favor of permanent (or semi-permanent) 
settlements often at the borders of cities (21). It is possible that 
the mentioned changes in global dromedary population dynam-
ics have led to an increased spread and heightened detection of 
MERS-CoV in this species, both of which have made dromedar-
ies the focus of most of the research conducted on MERS-CoV 
to date.
While coronaviruses are widespread in the animal kingdom 
(22), MERS-CoV seems to have a narrow host range. In the last 
few years, a large spectrum of domestic species have been nega-
tive after MERS-CoV serology tests, including horses, cattle, pig, 
water buffalo, chickens, goats, and Bactrian camels (13, 14, 17, 
23, 24). An exception was published recently when antibodies 
were detected in Alpaca (Vicugna pacos) in Qatar; this is notably 
in a specific region where MERS-CoV is already endemic in 
dromedary camels (25) (Figure 1).
A number of studies on wild birds and swine in Hong Kong, 
feral camels in Australia and bats in several countries have 
not identified MERS-CoV in these species (13, 26) (Figure 1). 
Putative precursors of MERS-CoV have been detected in species 
of African bats (27), and Corman and colleagues raised hypoth-
eses on the emergence of MERS-CoV from other animal species 
(28). They characterized the full genome of an African bat virus 
closely related to MERS-CoV and showed that human, camel, and 
bat viruses have phylogenetic relationships although these bat 
viruses are not closely similar to MERS-CoV. They suggest that, 
according to available serologic data on camels and humans since 
2012 and molecular investigations of known cases, MERS-CoV 
moved from bats to camels in sub-Saharan Africa. They also sug-
gest that camelids could be “mixing vessels for MERS-CoV and 
other mammalian CoVs” and that the virus can be transmitted 
between humans and camels (28). Up to now, MERS-CoV-like 
viruses have not been detected in any species other than camels, 
with the exception of an unconfirmed report of the detection of a 
very small fragment of MERS-CoV-like RNA in a specimen from 
a Taphozous perforatus bat collected in Saudi Arabia (29). T. per-
foratus and other bat species sampled in Egypt and Lebanon did 
not reveal MERS-CoV like viruses, although other coronaviruses 
were detected (30).
However, after more than 1800 reported cases over the past 
4 years from 27 countries, only one case–control study evaluat-
ing non-human risk factors for infection has been performed 
and published (31). This study, which included 30 primary 
cases and 116 age, sex, and neighborhood-matched controls, 
confirmed suspicions that direct and indirect exposure to 
dromedary camels in the 14 days prior to symptom onset are risk 
factors for infection (31). This study also found that advanced 
age (>60 years old), being male, and having certain underlying 
chronic health conditions, such as diabetes, heart conditions, 
and chronic lung disease, were independent risk factors for 
disease (31). Several other seroprevalence studies evaluating 
the extent of MERS-CoV infection in occupationally exposed 
persons (e.g., farmers, herders, slaughterhouse workers) have 
identified that these populations have a higher levels of sero-
prevalence (32, 33) when compared to the general population 
(32) (see Figure 1).
What is currently unclear is why all primary human MERS-
CoV cases have been reported from the Arabian Peninsula 
(2). Given that there is evidence of MERS-CoV circulation in 
dromedaries across large parts of Africa (11–15), it is likely that 
cases of MERS-CoV in humans have been missed. There are 
several potential hypotheses to explain this. First, surveillance 
for MERS-CoV in human populations focuses mostly on severe 
disease and on travelers returning from the Arabian Peninsula 
rather than on patients without a history of travel. Moreover, 
on-going surveillance in Saudi Arabia is now very intensive (34). 
Second, the prevalence of chronic underlying medical conditions 
in many countries in Africa is far lower than in the Middle East, 
with high rates of heart disease, diabetes, and obesity; third, it is 
likely that asymptomatic, mild or sub-clinical cases are missed 
with even the most robust surveillance systems. Fourth, the 
nature of contact with and the use of dromedary products differ 
between countries and cultures. Lastly, the viruses circulating in 
the Arabian Peninsula may be different. Although MERS-CoV 
in Africa are >99% identical at the nucleotide level with those in 
the Arabian Peninsula (35), it is conceivable that a few key amino-
acid differences may make a major change in transmissibility and 
virulence.
In the case of MERS-CoV transmission, there is a large 
uncertainty about the various exposure pathways associated 
with new dromedary camel or human cases, and, although 
published research on MERS-CoV is actively increasing (36), 
few transmission risks have yet been quantified. There is an obvi-
ous need to collect more critical information from virological 
and eco-epidemiological studies, but also from social sciences 
(anthropology, sociology) studies about camel–human relation-
ships, including behaviors at the interface. These studies can 
evaluate contact patterns, modes of transmission, viral shedding 
from animals, virus persistence in different environments, and 
biological samples. In view of all that remains to be done, we 
advocate a risk-ranking approach based on exposure pathways 
to guide allocation of resources for future data collection on the 
main sources of transmission of MERS-Cov. Risk assessment is 
a powerful modeling tool that enables decision-makers to deter-
mine the likelihood of disease occurrence and the magnitude of 
its consequences, which, in turn, allows identification of key steps 
and appropriate management measures to take. It is a structured 
and a systematic process that helps in the gathering of diverse 
and disparate information and data. However, when data are 
scarce and knowledge gaps are highly prevalent, such as with the 
recently identified MERS-CoV, too many transmission pathways 
would have been presented for the risk analysis. This is why we 
proposed, as a preliminary step, to call upon experts using expert-
opinion elicitation (EOE), to explore scenarios and hypotheses of 
transmission among animal(s), fomites, and humans. From the 
EOE outputs, a qualitative and/or quantitative risk assessment 
model could then be implemented. Expert-opinion elicitation 
has proven to be useful in other zoonotic disease risk assess-
ments, especially in cases where little quantitative information 
for the disease is already known (37, 38). The aim of this work is 
to allow for a triage of highly likely and unlikely pathways, and 
highlight areas that deserve increased attention for field surveys 
and studies.
FigUre 2 | simplified saaty scale used for comparing risk factors in the analytical hierarchy process.
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MaTerials anD MeThODs
In our study, experts were defined as being persons with 
relevant experience on the topic, including having extensive 
technical experience in epidemiological or virological research 
through MERS-CoV or related animal and/or human studies. 
Considering the recent emergence of the virus as a cause for 
human disease, extensive experience in MERS-CoV research 
itself was not an inclusion criteria; however, all included experts 
needed to have some experience working on MERS-CoV and/
or camel research topics within North Africa and the Arabian 
Peninsula, if not elsewhere. Furthermore, the experts’ publica-
tions and professional affiliations should have been significant 
enough to reflect this expertise. Recruitment was done first 
through relevance screening, where the researchers chose 
persons based on their own judgment. Following this original 
recruitment, “snowball” recruitment was used; experts who 
chose to participate were asked to recommend other experts to 
fill out the questionnaire. We aimed to enroll at least 10 experts, 
with extensive experience in relevant fields, for the exercise 
and, therefore, started by emailing invitations to 13 persons. All 
persons recommended by the first group of experts were invited 
to participate if their expertise was judged relevant for our study. 
All experts gave an informed consent before starting their par-
ticipation in the survey. Written consent was not necessary for 
this type of study; experts could withdraw themselves from the 
study at any time and all opinion “results” would be presented 
in an anonymous fashion.
Searching into MERS-CoV literature (36, 39) and meeting 
reports (40) allowed us to identify potential pathways and risk 
factors needed for designing the EOE (see Figure 1).
The questionnaire was designed online using the tool Survey 
Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com). A pilot survey was sent to 
the team members in order to test the survey and optimize the 
consistency of the questions. A clear description of the study 
objectives and of what was expected for their participation was 
provided to experts in the invitation email. Following their 
acceptance to participate, the experts were emailed a link to 
the online survey. The beginning of the online survey included 
instructions, examples, and contact information of the adminis-
tering researchers.
The questionnaire was designed to take about 30–40 min, and 
be filled in by experts individually using a link to online soft-
ware (see Image S1 in Supplementary Material). It consisted of 
expertise questions, relative importance of risk factor questions, 
transmission risk estimations, and open-ended responses, in that 
order, all of which will be described in more detail below.
The analytical hierarchy process (AHP) (41, 42) is widely used 
in marketing research (43) and has more recently been introduced 
as a tool in veterinary epidemiology (38, 44). AHP obtains opin-
ions on the weight of the relative importance of one attribute of an 
object or event over another, through pair-wise comparisons. In 
our questionnaire, we used the technique to obtain experts opin-
ions about the most relevant exposure pathways and their relative 
importance for five different animal–animal or animal–human 
transmission scenarios. Where appropriate, simple transmission 
diagrams were used to explain the potential exposure pathways 
in question. Experts were first asked to identify which exposure 
pathway they “believed in” out of a provided list, always with 
the opportunity to specify “other.” They were then asked to do 
pair-wise comparisons of each exposure pathway, comparing the 
risk factors of transmission, using the Saaty scale (41) (Figure 2).
In order to obtain quantitative estimates on the transmission 
risks from dromedaries to humans, we asked experts for their 
3-point estimation (minimum, most likely, and maximum) con-
sidering different types of exposure between 10 susceptible camel 
workers and dromedaries. Exposures included consumption 
of camel products (e.g., milk, urine, meat), direct and indirect 
contact; separate estimations were asked for different scenarios of 
younger (≤50 years) or older (>50 years) camel workers and adult 
or juvenile dromedaries. Using the same method, experts were 
also asked their estimates for transmission between potentially 
asymptomatic camel workers and family contacts.
Finally, a few open-ended questions on factors that may 
increase or decrease transmission and were posed to experts.
The survey was not anonymous in order to be able to come 
back to the experts in case of inconsistency in their answers. 
For every question, the experts were asked to respond not only 
expressing their opinion but also to assess their own confidence in 
their answers for each question, with a score from 1 to 5.
The analytical hierarchy process allowed us to weight each 
exposure pathway according to the level of importance given to it 
by each expert. Additional weight was attributed to each answer 
according to the level of confidence given by the expert. Then, for 
each pathway, a weighted aggregation of all expert answers was 
generated. An expert’s data were excluded from the combined 
estimates in case of any of the following criteria: <30% consist-
ency ratio, obvious erroneous entry, missing data for part of or 
the entire question. In this case, a 30% consistency ratio cut-off, 
taking into consideration that the historically recommended 
TaBle 1 | included expert Profiles.
Degree epidemiology Virology camel studies risk analysis chiropterology (bats)
1 MD ✓a 1–5 years ✓a 1–5 years
2 DVM ✓a 10+ years ✓a 10+ years ✓ 10+ years
3 MD ✓a 10+ years ✓a 10+ years
4 MPH ✓a 6–10 years ✓ 1–5 years ✓ 1–5 years
5 PhD ✓a 10+ years ✓ 1–5 years ✓ 6–10 years
6 DVM ✓a 10+ years ✓a 10+ years ✓ 10+ years ✓ 6–10 years ✓ 10+ years
7 DVM ✓ 10+ years ✓a 10+ years
8 DVM ✓a 1–5 years
9 PhD ✓a 1–5 years ✓a 6–10 years ✓ 10+ years
10 DVM ✓ 10+ years ✓ 10+ years
11 DVM ✓a 10+ years ✓ 6–10 years
12 PhD ✓a 1–5 years ✓ 1–5 years ✓ 1–5 years
13 MD ✓a 6–10 years ✓a 10+ years ✓ 6–10 years
14 DVM ✓a 10+ years ✓a 10+ years ✓ 1–5 years ✓ 6–10 years ✓ 1–5 years
aIncluding MERS-CoV specific.
5
Funk et al. MERS-CoV: Pathways of Transmission at the Animal–Human Interface
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org October 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 88
10% cut-off is shown to be too severe for comparison matrices 
that have >3 variables and that the cut-off should increase with 
number of variables (45, 46); our questions introduced up to eight 
variables for each matrix. The overall level of agreement across 
experts in their ranking of the selected risk factors was calculated 
using the Kendall’s W coefficient. The average weighted mini-
mum, most likely and maximum transmission risk for each of the 
3-point estimation questions was also generated using a similar 
weighting mechanism. An expert’s data was excluded from the 
3-point distribution combined estimates in case of consistently 
highly outlying estimates or missing data for part of or the entire 
distribution. Outliers were defined as estimated risks that were 
consistently greater than twice the estimates of all other experts. 
When possible, for missing or erroneous data, experts were re-
contacted by email to clarify. The mean confidence level, across all 
included experts, was calculated for each pair-wise comparison 
and 3-point distribution question. Open-ended responses were 
summarized qualitatively.
resUlTs
Overall, 18 experts were contacted to take part in the question-
naire. Of these, 16 responded to the invitation, and 14 filled out the 
questionnaire in full, contributing data to this study. All respond-
ents, except 1, had expertise in either MERS-CoV epidemiology 
and/or virology; the remaining expert had significant experience 
in camel production and husbandry and general epidemiology. 
Six and three respondents had experience in conducting studies 
of camels and bats, respectively. A detailed description of each 
participant’s expertise can be found in Table 1.
Mers-coV infection of  
Dromedary camels
On the topic of how dromedaries become infected with MERS-
CoV, the following exposure pathways were presented to experts: 
infestation of infected bats in close proximity, daily close contact 
with infected camel workers (both ≤50 and >50 years old), short-
term contact with an infected dromedary herd, short-term con-
tact with a non-dromedary species infected with MERS-CoV, and 
infection occurring during dromedary calving season. All of the 
above risk factors were selected by at least 5/14 experts. However, 
the most highly selected and importantly weighted exposures 
were “short-term contact with an infected dromedary herd” and 
“timing coinciding with dromedary calving season” (Figure 3A). 
Two experts selected the “other” option and specified the most 
risky season is dromedary-weaning season. Furthermore, one 
expert selected “other” and included the possible risk associated 
with contaminated camel feed.
Mers-coV infection between  
Dromedary herds
Risk factors that were presented to experts, when asking about 
the possibility of dromedaries from different herds infecting 
each other, were: nomadic dromedary herds, introduction of 
a new dromedary into the herd, high dromedary density area, 
dromedaries taken to racetracks, dromedaries entered into/taken 
to beauty contests, dromedaries brought to communal water-
points, dromedaries brought to/sold at markets, dromedaries 
pass through border points. Each factor was considered risky 
by at least 5 (36%) of the 14 experts, and no additional risk fac-
tors from experts were provided. The most highly selected (i.e., 
>70% of experts) risk factors, in order of weighted importance, 
were: bringing dromedaries to markets, introduction of a new 
dromedary into the herd, high dromedary density area, and 
bringing dromedaries to communal water-points. The first three 
of these risk factors were given similar weights by experts, while 
the last (communal water-points) was thought to only be half as 
important as them. Experts had sufficient agreement on their 
ranking of risk factors (Kendalls W = 0.25, p = 0.003), and had a 
mean response certainty of 3.9 and 3.8 (out of 5) for choosing risk 
factors and the subsequent rankings, respectively.
Mers-coV Primary infection in humans
Exposure pathways for human primary case occurrence included: 
infestation of MERS-CoV infected bats in close proximity to 
human populations, contact with a MERS-CoV infected herd of 
dromedaries, contact with a non-dromedary MERS-CoV infected 
species, blood-biting pests (e.g., fleas, ticks) on an infected 
FigUre 3 | (a) (left). exposure pathways and relative weights of risk factors for a dromedary camel from an uninfected herd to become infected with 
Mers-coV. ^p < 0.001. (B) (right). exposure pathways and relative weights of risk factors for a camel worker or other human to become infected with 
Mers-coV. ^^p < 0.01. *Mean confidence for overall choice of risk factors for this question with a scale of confidence between 1 (not confident) and 5 (very 
confident).
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animal species or on humans, contact with another human who 
is asymptomatically infected with MERS-CoV. All experts agreed 
that contact with infected dromedaries or asymptomatic humans 
were major risks for disease transmission, with the former being 
of higher risk (Figure  3B). About a third of experts (29–36%) 
thought that contact with MERS-CoV infected species other than 
dromedaries or bats may also play a role in human infection. 
Only one expert considered the possibility of blood-biting pests 
transmitting infection between dromedaries or other species and 
humans. Experts suggested no “other” risk factors.
Transmission from infected Dromedaries 
to camel Workers
The following possible exposure pathways from dromedaries to 
camel workers were presented to the experts: direct contact (e.g., 
face-to-face, touching, kissing), indirect contact (e.g., cleaning 
camel environment, contact with dromedary waste), consump-
tion of unpasteurized milk, consumption or use of dromedary 
urine, and consumption of raw dromedary meat. All pathways 
were thought to be possible by the experts (≥50% each) and direct 
contact with dromedaries was thought to be a transmission risk 
factor by all experts (Figure  4). When asked to quantify these 
risks, by estimating the likely incidence of human cases, sepa-
rately for adult and juvenile camels and older (>50  years) and 
younger (≤50 years) camel workers, experts estimated direct and 
then indirect contact with the highest risk; generally there was 
a slightly higher risk estimated when contact was with juvenile 
camels, and a clear trend for higher estimated risk when older vs. 
younger camel workers were exposed (see Table 2). Specifically, 
the risk of transmission was thought to be low (≤5%) for camel 
workers consuming or using camel products, such as milk, urine, 
or raw meat. The estimation of the incidence was quantified as 
being between 13 and 24% for indirect contact with an infected 
dromedary regardless of whether adult or juvenile, and between 
22 and 33% with direct contact, varying by the age of both the 
camels and camel workers.
Transmission from asymptomatic  
Mers-coV cases to contacts
Experts were asked to estimate the risk of transmission from an 
asymptomatic infected individual to other individuals in close 
contact. The estimated “most likely” risk of transmission if the 
potentially asymptomatic camel workers were either ≤50 years or 
>50 years old was 9%. The experts had a mean confidence of 2.8 
(out of 5) for their answers for both age groups.
risk Factors for symptomatic  
Mers-coV infection in humans
At least 10 of the 14 experts agreed that older age (>50 years), 
being immunocompromised, and the amount of viral dose 
transmitted, increases the chances that infected camel workers or 
other persons will become symptomatic after MERS-CoV infec-
tion. Being immunocompromised was given the highest overall 
comparative weight as a risk factor, followed by amount of viral 
dose transmitted. Also, genetic susceptibility and recent occur-
rence of an epidemic period for another disease (e.g., Influenza) 
were identified as risky by three and four experts, respectively. 
Experts had a good level of agreement on their ranking of the 
selected risk factors (Kendalls W =  0.61, p <  0.01), and had a 
mean response certainty of 3.4 and 3.3 (out of 5) for choosing risk 
factors and the subsequent rankings, respectively.
responses to Open-ended Questions on 
Transmission Dynamics
Experts were asked which factors led to increase viral shed-
ding in MERS-CoV infected dromedaries. The most highly 
FigUre 4 | exposure pathways and relative weights of risk factors for types of transmission between dromedaries and camel workers. ^p < 0.01. 
*Mean confidence for overall choice of risk factors for this question with a scale of confidence between 1 (not confident) and 5 (very confident).
TaBle 2 | estimated percentage transmission risk from adult and juvenile dromedaries to camel workers (cW).
adult dromedary Juvenile dromedary
≤50-year-old cW >50-year-old cW ≤50-year-old cW >50-year-old cW
Most likely Min/max ca Most likely Min/max ca Most likely Min/max ca Most likely Min/max ca
Milk 3 0/13 2.9 4 1/16 2.8 – – – – -
Urine 3 0/9 3.2 3 0/12 2.9 5 0/12 3 4 0/12 2.9
Raw meat 4 0/15 2.8 3 0/13 2.9 1 1/6 2.9 5 2/14 2.8
Direct 
contact
25 4/45 2.9 29 5/55 3 22 7/39 2.9 33 8/57 3.2
Indirect 
contact
13 1/33 2.9 18 4/36 2.8 19 4/34 3.1 24 6/48 3.1
aC = Mean level of expert confidence for estimate with a scale of confidence between 1 (not confident) and 5 (very confident).
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suggested items included: juvenile dromedaries lacking anti-
body immunity (n =  4), immunosuppressive conditions and 
secondary disease (n = 4), animal density (n = 2) and stress-
ful environments for the animals (e.g., at slaughterhouses, 
markets) (n =  2). Experts believed factors that may lead to 
increased or more efficient transmission between MERS-CoV 
infected dromedaries and humans include repeated close 
contact with dromedaries with the chance of contact with 
respiratory secretions (n = 3), host susceptibility or immune 
status (n = 2), increased virulence of the virus through genetic 
recombination or other (n = 2), and environmental contami-
nation of camel-visited areas (n = 2). Experts were also asked 
whether or not they thought any other viruses might cross-
immunize with MERS-CoV for either dromedaries or humans. 
Of the 12 experts who answered this question, 3 said “No,” 
while 6 were unsure or thought this was possible, and 3 experts 
believed that other coronaviruses might cross-immunize with 
MERS-CoV.
8Funk et al. MERS-CoV: Pathways of Transmission at the Animal–Human Interface
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DiscUssiOn
Our results use expert opinion to weigh the different transmis-
sion risks of MERS-CoV between animals and from animals 
to humans. Despite a lack of quantitative data, our results are 
supported by growing evidence from research published from 
MERS-CoV affected countries. Risk assessment is a tool that 
allows for the gathering of accessible data and information (e.g., 
expert opinion). The preliminary approach proposed in this 
paper synthesized available evidence regarding primary MERS-
CoV transmission to humans. Our results highlight a general 
consensus in the order/rank of pathways, as well as for potential 
drivers and risk factors. According to the experts included in our 
study, dromedaries play a major role in transmission. However, 
the role of bats could not be ruled out and should be investigated 
further.
Despite the fact that new research reveals traces of antibodies 
against MERS-CoV in two livestock handlers in Kenya in 2013/14 
(47), it is surprising that no locally acquired primary human 
cases have been reported where humans and infected dromedary 
camels are present outside the Arabian Peninsula. Recent work-
shops on MERS-CoV (Doha in April 2015 and Cairo in May 
2015), organized by WHO, FAO, and the World Organisation for 
Animal Health (OIE), have produced numerous recommenda-
tions to improve surveillance and suggest research in animal and 
human populations (48). One of these recommendations is to 
investigate whether and why MERS-CoV infections of humans 
appear not to occur in Africa despite the high levels of infection 
in dromedaries, and why the virus is apparently absent in camels 
in Central Asia (dromedary and Bactrian camels).
The exact role of dromedary camels as a potential reservoir 
for MERS-CoV is also still unclear, and further investigations 
should be carried out to identify the mechanism of virus 
transmission and quantify the stability of the virus in various 
conditions more clearly. MERS-CoV has been detected in the 
oropharyngeal tract, feces, milk, and meat of dromedaries (21, 
49–51). However, the modes of transmission are not clearly 
known. Our experts felt that the transmission risk from con-
sumption of raw camel products, including milk, meat, and 
urine is low. It is assumed that the infection from dromedary 
camels to humans occurs through droplets or contact as high 
viral loads have been detected in the upper respiratory tract and 
nasal mucous membrane of dromedaries (52). However, milk-
ing activities and drinking unpasteurized milk, which is highly 
prevalent in Saudi Arabia (53), are considered as risky for the 
occurrence of primary cases in human populations. There is 
no evidence of MERS-CoV in camel meat, and it is known that 
cooking would kill the virus. One study from Qatar identified 
MERS-CoV in milk, but it was unclear whether the virus was 
excreted in the milk or if the milk had been contaminated by 
traditional milking techniques, which involves calves being used 
to initiate the milking process (50).
The role of and the extent to which infected asymptomatic 
human cases play a role in transmission is unknown. WHO 
estimates that ~20% of reported MERS cases are asymptomatic 
(54), but this estimate is likely underestimated given surveil-
lance focuses on severe cases requiring hospitalization (55) and 
evidence from serologic studies (32). One study documented 
prolonged shedding of MERS-CoV in an asymptomatic health 
care worker (56), which provides evidence that, if not properly 
isolated, asymptomatic cases in health care settings and in the 
community could lead to onward transmission. The experts 
included in this study believe that contact with asymptomatic 
cases is as important as that with infected dromedaries. 
Comprehensive testing of contacts of MERS-CoV patients, 
regardless of the presence of symptoms, is required to evaluate 
infection between known cases. The role of asymptomatic cases 
or carriers, if they are indeed infected, also needs careful consid-
eration in the community setting. Not all reported primary cases 
can be traced back to contact with dromedaries, and it is likely, at 
least in some cases, that an asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic 
case may be an intermediary between dromedary contact and a 
symptomatic human case.
After 4  years, research on the role of camels and/or other 
sources of primary transmissions to human is inadequate. So far, 
most MERS-CoV studies have focused on virological or clinical 
aspects of the disease. No comprehensive analytical epidemio-
logical studies have yet been carried out in MERS-CoV affected 
countries. With the exception of one case–control study (31) and 
individual case studies following investigation into single cases, 
transmission between dromedary herds and between dromedar-
ies and humans has not been well studied. Even these detailed 
investigations are limited in terms of deciphering the cause-effect 
relationship. As human cases of MERS are relatively sporadic/
rare, case control studies, especially matched case–control studies, 
can be well adapted during epidemics or outbreaks investigations 
and must be performed. Cohort studies are the best option in 
order to compare incidence among exposed (e.g., camel workers, 
immunocompromised people, etc.) and non-exposed popula-
tions. However, conducting cohort studies for rare diseases may 
be difficult.
In regions without reported human clinical cases of MERS, 
cross-sectional surveys based on serological investigation 
in humans and identification and quantification of potential 
risk factors for infection (behaviors, husbandry, contacts with 
camels and camel products, etc.) will assist in the suggestion 
of hypotheses, if human infection is prevalent and statistically 
exploitable for inference at the population level. Outside of the 
Middle East, these studies need to be undertaken, especially 
outside of the Arabian Peninsula and in African countries 
where MERS-CoV has been detected and/or isolated in drom-
edaries. Outside of the Arabian Peninsula, a number of joint 
human/camel serological studies are currently underway in 
North Africa (Pasteur Institut, Pers Comm) and planned in 
sub-Saharan African countries (HKU and Cirad, Pers Comm). 
For instance, in Ethiopia where MERS-CoV strains have been 
detected in camels (Peiris et al., Pers Comm), studies in at-risk 
human communities (e.g., nomadic people in close contact with 
camels, abattoir workers) have to be implemented: both analyti-
cal epidemiological studies and surveys on acute febrile illness 
(57), including respiratory and other signs could lead to clues 
about MERS-CoV infection and/or MERS-disease in humans.
At a more global scale, understanding differences in expo-
sures and behaviors of individuals with dromedaries across the 
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Middle East and Africa is likely to explain some of the differ-
ences in potential infection risk. For that purpose, “ecological 
studies” could help to explore diverse drivers of transmission 
among different environments and societies. However, studies 
based on aggregated data are prone to many biases (58) making 
it difficult to know if individuals have really been exposed to the 
risk factor in question. Furthermore, social sciences have to be 
enlisted in order to puzzle out the relationships between camels 
and humans. Outputs can serve for epidemiological studies 
and modeling (e.g., multi-agents systems, see hereunder). 
Additionally, improved surveillance systems in humans and 
animals in rural and nomadic areas are required for MERS-CoV 
considering possible changes of the public health situation due 
to virus evolution (e.g., toward more pathogenic strains or dif-
fusion of strains from areas with human disease, etc.) over time, 
modification of camel husbandry, etc. For population-based 
studies, epidemiology and surveillance, we need to have species-
adapted and validated serological tools. Indeed, performances of 
tests are often lacking and should be assessed using frequentist 
or Bayesian approaches.
In addition to epidemiological studies, additional data from 
viral ecology studies among camels and other species, includ-
ing bats, are required; phylogeography studies of MERS-CoV, 
and ecological studies on bat species living in the proximity 
of camels and suspected to play a role in the circulation of the 
virus, including a better understanding of their home ranges, 
migration patterns, biology (especially reproduction), roost-
ing sites, and mechanisms of contact with camels are needed. 
Studies of viral shedding in animals, of virus persistence in 
different biological specimens of humans and animals, and 
in the environment under different conditions would help to 
quantify, or at least help to characterize, potential transmission 
risks.
The effect of MERS-CoV on camel health is not well 
documented; is the camel an asymptomatic carrier (reservoir/
vector) or can MERS-CoV infection induce mild symptoms 
and/or pave the way for secondary infections? To address this 
question, camel studies should focus not only on MERS but 
also on the diverse etiologies of respiratory syndromes (59). 
This could be significant because, first, if MERS is recognized 
as a camel disease, more research resources could be allocated, 
second, super-infections could play a role in MERS-CoV 
transmission traits. Finally, multi-pathogens studies and 
multi-disease surveillance in camel populations can improve, 
through an economy of scale, MERS-CoV detection and the 
collection of data and metadata. Similarly, health conditions 
and infectious and parasitic diseases of camels may have an 
impact on MERS-CoV ecology and/or MERS epidemiological 
features. Indeed, immunosuppressive effects of several origins 
(husbandry and farming conditions, under-nutrition, deficien-
cies, parasites, co-infections, etc.) could enhance the infectivity 
of the MERS-CoV.
Considering the recent emergence of MERS-CoV as a 
zoonotic threat, and the lack of information already quantified 
on it, we appropriately included a small number of experts in 
this EOE exercise, but those who had diverse and extensive 
experience in relevant fields. The questions included in the 
exercise were feasible for persons who are not accustomed to 
formal prioritization methods; AHP is known to be adapted 
for complex information situations, to be intuitively under-
standable and to allow scientists to score the attributes with 
minimal confusion. Our study has several limitations. First, it 
is commonly considered best practice to give a training exercise 
on EOE methods as well as provide a multi-page literature 
review on the topic in question to participating experts, prior 
to administering the questionnaire, however, this was not 
done here. In this case, experts were provided with a detailed 
document describing how to fill out the questionnaire, with 
examples, and were invited to contact the authors if they had 
any questions or confusion (see Image S1 in Supplementary 
Material). It is possible to “calibrate” experts, by including some 
items in the questionnaire for which a general scientific consen-
sus or quantification already exists; the expert response to these 
questions can then be matched to the real answer in order to see 
how close that expert arrives. There was no calibration done in 
this study, largely due to the fact that there are almost no solidly 
quantified risks associated with MERS-CoV at present. Experts 
were weighted instead only on their confidence level for each 
question answered; however, it is always possible that experts 
are overconfident, giving scores that do not reflect their real 
uncertainty on their knowledge of a variable. Linguistic uncer-
tainty in the questionnaire could have led to some bias; experts 
with varied origins and experience can interpret questions and 
imagine contexts differently, and this can be exacerbated by 
ambiguity or lack of specificity in questions. For the aggregation 
of our results, we used a mathematical approach by combining 
the weighted estimates of all experts. Another option would 
have been to use a more inclusive and participatory behavioral 
approach that would allow experts to revise their answers after 
seeing those of others and eventually come to a consensus 
together. However, empirical results have suggested that 
mathematical methods can outperform behavioral techniques 
in certain circumstances (60, 61), and it is also possible that 
group dynamics could bias estimations of risks toward a more 
extreme consensus (62). Overall, the experts were more certain 
in answering the AHP questions, which involved choosing and 
ranking risk factors. For all animal–animal or animal–human 
AHP questions, the experts consistently had mean confidence 
levels of close to 4 (out of 5), however, when asked to rank risk 
factors for asymptomatic human–human transmission, the 
mean confidence level was lower (closer to 3). When estimating 
minimum, most likely, and maximum transmission risks based 
on scenarios, the experts had lower overall mean confidence in 
their answers, with scores of between 2.8 and 3.2 for all estima-
tions. This lower certainty is likely related to the fact that so few 
transmission risks for MERS have yet been quantified, whereas 
in choosing and ranking risk factors, there are already strong 
trends as presented in the literature.
Apart from virological, ecological, and epidemiological 
approaches, simulation models will allow for the testing of 
different scenarios of transmission, and this can be compared 
with reported cases. However, the scarcity of the data at the ani-
mal–human interface impedes the use of data-driven models like 
the stratified (animal–human) SEIR models, contact networks 
TaBle 3 | recommended Mers-coV studies at the animal–human interface.
studies Main outputs Key strengths shortcomings and constraints
1. experimental studies
1.1 Virology Virus strains comparisons among 
animals and humans. Phylogeography
Deciphering of pathways between mammals 
species
Statistical power: require sufficient and 
representative strains to be analyzed
1.2 Experimental infections 
in bats and camels (and 
other livestock species)
Pathophysiology and clinical 
outcomes. Immunological response. 
Virus ecology; virus shedding in 
animals
Epidemiological parameters for modeling, 
e.g., shedding, viral excretion
Bioethics. Biosecurity. Costly
2. (empirical) Observational studies
2.1 Ecological studies on 
bats and camels
Roles as reservoirs and/or vectors of 
MERS-CoV
Identification of drivers of MERS-CoV ecology Authorization to work on endangered bats. 
Need efficient non-invasive methods. Devices to 
follow livestock movements and bats migrations
2.2 Epidemiological studies Prevalence and incidence in camels/
humans. Serological test performance 
in humans/animals. At-risk behaviors 
and risk factors for MERS-disease in 
humans
Cross-sectional and ecological studies, 
which are relatively simple to be carried out
Costly for case–control and cohort studies
2.3 Sociology and 
anthropology studies
At-risk human behaviors at individual 
and community levels
Will feed epidemiological studies and models Implementation of participatory approaches in 
pastoral and challenging territories (e.g., low-
income countries, remote areas)
2.4 One health surveillance 
systems
Follow-up of virus, antibodies, clinical 
signs in humans and animals
Detection of emergence in humans; 
collection of viruses. infection timeline
Complex (need agreement among public health 
and vet services) and costly (need sustainability)
3. Modeling
3.1 Probabilistic models 
(e.g., QRA)
At-risk pathways of transmission Useful for disease management even if all 
mechanisms are not known
Long and iterative process for QRA. Data and 
information needed, including experiment data
3.2 Dynamic models  
(e.g., SIR, IBM, SNA)
Testing hypotheses (simulation) of 
MERS-CoV transmission. Drawing up 
the levels of vaccination needed
Deciphering of transmission ways between 
mammals species
Need data. Complex models required  
(SIR stratification animal/human, joint models, 
e.g., SIR and SNA, etc.)
3.3 Multiple-criteria  
decision-making or MCDA
Decision process. Risk mapping for 
spatialized MCDA
Straightforward to be implemented  
(literature review and expert opinions)
Model validation (but could be done with Human 
cases in Arabian peninsula)
SIR, compartmental models; IBM, individual-based modeling or multi-agent systems; SNA, social network analysis or contact network analysis; MCDA, multi-criteria decision 
analysis; QRA, quantitative risk assessment.
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models, etc. Moreover, in order to analyze and simulate the 
complete pattern of the disease, there is also a need to capture 
the behaviors of animals and people (63). The individual-based 
model built on multi-agents systems is a computerized system 
combining multiple interacting agents (e.g., humans, animals) 
within a given environment (64). Such a model could be built 
in close interaction with stakeholders (farmers, camel workers, 
etc. (65)) and could drive toward more precise hypotheses about 
initial transmissions to humans (66).
This EOE study has several limitations but it is a preliminary 
step for implementing a more comprehensive risk assessment. 
Risk assessment is a time-consuming and iterative process that 
needs to be fed by several sources of data, lab experiments and 
field observations (see Table 3 for a summary of recommended 
studies). Risk communication, which is part of the risk analysis 
and closely linked to the risk assessment, is essential, especially 
considering that MERS is a major public health issue and could 
have indirect economic and social impacts on the “dromedary 
world.” The questionable responsibility of dromedaries regarding 
human MERS-CoV cases could indeed spur inappropriate and 
overdone control measures. More broadly, this EOE can help in 
identifying gaps and needs in terms of experimental, field and 
modeling studies that will give a better understanding of the 
zoonotic transmission pathways of MERS.
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